Curtailment & Demand-Response Revenue Calculator for Bitcoin Miners (Canada/US)
Getting paid to turn your miners off during grid peaks sounds like free money, and the demand-response marketing leans hard into that framing. But there’s a cost the brochures skip: every hour you curtail is an hour of mining profit you don’t earn. Whether a curtailment program actually pays depends entirely on which of those two numbers is bigger — the payment for shutting down, or the profit you forgo by shutting down. This calculator does the full accounting across the major Canadian and US programs, and the answer is often the opposite of what people expect.
Quick answer
Demand-response and curtailment programs pay a Bitcoin miner to shut down when the grid is stressed — but "getting paid to turn off" only makes money if the payment beats the profit you give up by turning off. This calculator does that full accounting: it adds the capacity payment (paid for being available) and any event-energy payment (paid per MWh you curtail), then SUBTRACTS the mining gross profit you forgo during those hours, to show your true net annual benefit. The result is often counter-intuitive. A miner with very cheap power and a fat margin can LOSE money joining a demand-response program, because every curtailed hour is a highly profitable hour thrown away. A miner whose power is expensive during peak events is the opposite — it is being paid to stop doing something that was barely profitable anyway. Pick your program to auto-fill the notice window and fit, then enter your real tariff numbers.
The question is never "how much does the program pay?" — it is "does the program pay MORE than the profit I lose by curtailing?" Fast, lossless programs with rare events (Alberta FFR, Ontario ICI's five annual peaks, ERCOT 4CP) tend to win because you forgo few profitable hours; long-notice programs that curtail many hours can be net-negative for a profitable miner. Model it before you sign.
Method. Annual MWh curtailed = fleet kW × hours ÷ 1,000. Capacity revenue = your $/kW-year × kW (paid whether or not events fire). Event-energy payment = $/MWh × MWh curtailed (many programs pay $0 here — the value is the capacity payment and the avoided energy). Mining gross profit forgone = (your mining revenue − your electricity cost) × the curtailed kWh — this is the real cost of shutting down, and it already nets out the electricity you didn't buy. Net annual benefit = capacity + event-energy − gross profit forgone. Program presets fill the notice window and mining-fit from the demand-response programs dataset; the payment figures there are indicative, so enter YOUR tariff's real numbers (from the operator's DR tariff sheet). This models the economic trade only — it ignores wear-savings from downtime, ramp constraints, and penalty clauses for missing a called event. Related: the demand-charge calculator, cost to mine 1 BTC, and the Canadian curtailment guide.
The counter-intuitive part
Run the numbers and a pattern emerges. A miner with genuinely cheap power and a fat margin can lose money joining a demand-response program that curtails many hours a year, because each of those hours was highly profitable — the capacity payment simply doesn’t beat the stack of forgone profit. The miner who wins at demand response is the one whose power is expensive relative to mining revenue during peak events: for them, curtailing forgoes little or no profit, so the payment is close to pure upside. That’s the honest insight the calculator surfaces — and it’s why the best programs for a profitable miner are the ones with rare events: Alberta’s sub-second Fast Frequency Response, Ontario’s Industrial Conservation Initiative that targets just five system peaks a year, ERCOT’s four coincident-peak intervals. You get the capacity payment for being available while giving up only a handful of hours.
What it models, and what it doesn’t
The program selector fills in the notice window and mining-fit from our demand-response programs dataset, but the payment figures there are indicative — you enter your own tariff’s real capacity and event-energy numbers, because those are negotiated and site-specific. The math is deliberately clean: capacity payment plus any per-MWh event payment, minus the mining gross profit you forgo (your revenue minus your electricity cost, over the curtailed kilowatt-hours). It models the economic trade only. It doesn’t credit the wear-and-tear savings of running your fleet fewer hours, and it doesn’t subtract the penalty clauses some programs levy for missing a called event — both of which matter and both of which you should weigh separately. For the sovereignty angle on Quebec’s rate structure and why the province’s regulatory posture pushes miners toward and away from these programs, see the Canadian curtailment guide; pair this with the demand-charge calculator and cost to mine 1 BTC for the full picture of what your power actually costs.
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Last reviewed July 18, 2026.
