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Supported Miners, Firmwares & Control Boards

DCENT_Toolbox 2.5.0 is one open-source, fee-free command-line tool that detects the vendor, identifies the firmware and fingerprints the control board of a Bitcoin miner, then offers only the actions that are safe for that exact combination. It drives 4 real vendor backends (Bitmain, MicroBT WhatsMiner, Canaan/Avalon, BitAxe), detects and manages 6 firmware ecosystems, and understands 7 control-board families spanning the Antminer S9 through the S21. Anything it cannot positively identify routes to a read-only generic cgminer backend — never a silent Bitmain mis-route. Support here is stated per route, not per model, so “the adapter exists” is never mistaken for “this operation is validated on your miner.” 0% dev fee, no cloud, no license server, GPL-3.0.

What does “supported” actually mean here?

DCENT_Toolbox reports exactly what it proved, never more. “Detected” is not “safe to configure.” “Adapter present” is not “operation validated.” “Package parsed” is not “safe to install.” Every mutating operation must resolve to an exact model, control board, incumbent firmware, evidence level and recovery route before it will run — dcent install is dry-run/plan by default, and the live write step executes only on an explicit operator confirmation (--yes) and the proof-ladder.

Because of that, this page uses five plain confidence levels. Read them before you trust any row below.

Confidence levels used on this page

LevelWhat it meansWhere it currently applies
ProductionRead paths and owner-side audit, backed by the offline test suite and exercised against real miners.Discovery, identification, doctor triage, fingerprinting, info/pools reads and audit/clean across all four vendor backends; the identity engine that refuses to guess a board; verify-mining on the five natively-proven platforms.
BetaA real customer write route exists, with gates, and is still accumulating live capstone evidence.Antminer S9 (am1-XIL) — public-beta network write plus SD trial. Bitaxe / ESP32-S3 — HTTP OTA and USB first-flash on a signed manifest, fail-closed.
ExperimentalRoute-backed planning, staging or lab execution. Not a customer write path.am2-XIL S19 Pro / S19j Pro self-update lab route and external-media preparation; S17 Pro media builder; am3-AML lab rootfs-window; cv1835 runtime candidate staging and rollback.
Recovery-onlyExact vendor recovery media or held archives can be verified and analysed. Explicitly not an install path.Plain S19 (Xilinx vendor recovery media); am2-XIL held-archive recovery profiles; am3-BB NAND install pending SD recovery and restore-to-stock promotion.
Detected-but-unsupportedThe toolbox identifies it and reads from it. There is no write authority, deliberately.Unknown gear on the generic cgminer read path; CVitek / CV1835 install-denied; S19k Pro on cv1835; stock S19 / S19k / S21 first-install evidence gaps; the optional asic-rs read matrix.

Read this before you read the tables

A marketing name is not a control board. The same “S19j Pro” ships on am2-XIL (Xilinx Zynq), am3-BB (TI AM335x BeagleBone), am3-AML (Amlogic A113D) and cv1835 (Cvitek) — four different silicon realities with four different answers to “can I flash this.”

So the toolbox refuses to guess. A model name alone never silently selects a control board when more than one family fits; a generic soc=zynq observation stays {am1, am2} rather than resolving to am2. An ambiguous identity stays ambiguous until an independently observed --board-family or an SSH/HTTP SoC signal disambiguates it. That is by design, not a gap.

Which vendor backends does DCENT_Toolbox drive?

Four real backends plus a read-only fallback. The write column is what the backend is capable of driving — not a promise that a given write is validated on your unit.

Vendor backendHow it’s drivenRead (scan / detect / info / pools)Write (config / tune / install)
Bitmain AntminerHTTP + SSH + cgminer RPCYesYes — firmware- and board-dependent (see the install matrix)
MicroBT WhatsMinerBTMiner write-API token crypto (get_tokenmd5_crypt(salt) → SHA-256 → AES-256-ECB + newsalt signature)YesYes — config + OTA
Canaan / Avaloncgminer JSON-RPC (port 4028) + ascset; PROD=AvalonMiner detectionYesYes — ascset privileged writes
BitAxe / DCENT_OS for ESPAxeOS-compatible HTTP REST + USB serialYesYes — settings, ASIC tuning bounds, OTA + NVS + first-flash helpers
Unknown / otherGeneric cgminer RPCYes — read-onlyNone. Never auto-written

An optional Rust device-abstraction extra, asic-rs (dcent scan --use-asic-rs), can widen the read-only device matrix beyond the four native backends, and degrades cleanly when it is not installed. That is a read matrix, not a write matrix.

Why the fallback matters

The single most expensive failure mode in a mixed shop is a tool that assumes Bitmain because the miner answered on port 4028. Multi-vendor detection sets make=BITMAIN only on a positive Bitmain signal. Everything else lands in the generic cgminer read path.

Which firmwares can it detect and manage?

Six firmware ecosystems are detected and driven from one CLI — for inspection, recovery planning and route-specific install support.

FirmwareDetectInfo / pools / configAudit & cleanRevert-to-stock
Bitmain stock (S9 / S17 / S19 / S19j Pro / S21 / T19 class)YesYesYesn/a — is stock
BraiinsOS+ (am1 Zynq 7010, am2 Zynq 7007S)YesYesYesCode-complete, operator-gated — live proof pending
LuxOS (Bitmain-derived stock fork, incl. AM335x BeagleBone carriers)YesYesYesYes — uninstall.sh
VNish (Zynq / Amlogic / BeagleBone / CVitek / Legacy)YesYesYesCode-complete, operator-gated — live proof pending
DCENT_OS (Antminer, GPL-3.0)YesYesYesYes — uninstall.sh; A/B sysupgrade is self-update
DCENT_OS for ESP / DCENT_axeYesYesn/an/a — OTA/USB package rails

Revert footnote: “Remove accepted” is not “stock observed.” DCENT_OS and LuxOS uninstall.sh are the proven revert lanes; BraiinsOS+ and VNish remove paths are code-complete and operator-gated, with live proof still pending.

The firmware audit is an owner-side defensive capability: some closed-source third-party miner firmware ships hidden SSH backdoors, phone-home telemetry, a device blacklist, or silent dev-fee redirection. dcent audit detects these and dcent clean removes them from hardware you own. The firmware names in the table above are simply the firmwares the toolbox can detect and manage — the list is a capability statement, not an accusation about any of them.

Which control boards map to which Antminer generations?

Seven families: six Antminer control boards plus the ESP32-S3 Bitaxe class. What is possible per family depends on the hardware, not on software effort — the firmware-signing chain on newer Antminer boards is a real wall.

Board familySoCAntminer generations it appears in
am1-XILXilinx Zynq 7010 / 7007 variantsS9 / S9i / S9j / S9D / T9+ (plus evidence-only S11 / S15 / T15)
am2-XILXilinx Zynq 7007S / 7020 variantsS17 / S17+ / S17e; T17 / T17+ / T17e; S19 / S19a / S19i / S19j / S19 Pro / S19 XP / S19k and Hydro variants; T19 / T21; S21 / S21 XP Hydro class
am3-BBTI AM335x (BeagleBone)S19-88 / S19j / S19j Pro — DCENT removable-media target only for S19j Pro on S19J_IO_BOARD_V2_0
am3-AMLAmlogic A113DS19j Pro / S19k Pro / S21 (Amlogic) class
cv1835Cvitek CV1835 (ARM64)S19j Pro / S19k Pro / S21 / KS3 / S19 XP class
bcb100STMicro STM32MP15Braiins Open Hardware reference control board — not an Antminer factory board
esp32-s3Espressif ESP32-S3Bitaxe class: Max, Ultra, Supra, Gamma, Hex Ultra, Hex Supra (DCENT_OS for ESP / DCENT_axe)

The generation walk, in one line

S9 (am1-XIL) → S17/T17 (am2-XIL) → S19/T19 (am2-XIL, am3-BB) → S19 XP / S19k (am2-XIL, am3-AML, cv1835) → T21/S21 (am2-XIL, am3-AML, cv1835). The board families overlap the marketing generations; they do not map one-to-one, which is exactly why identity has to be resolved per unit and never per model name.

Can it install DCENT_OS on any Antminer? The honest per-board reality

No — not on every board, and not yet for most of them. “Install custom firmware on any Antminer, software-only” is not true. Stock units ship with SSH disabled and, post-July-2019, RSA-signed firmware; getting a root foothold hits a generational hardware wall. DCENT_Toolbox is explicit about exactly where each rung holds, and keeps unlock, route, artifact and proof state separate.

Control board · generationStock foothold realityDCENT_OS install readinessVerdict · confidence
am1-XIL — S9 / S9i / S9j / S9D / T9+SSH-enable possible on evidenced legacy stock epochs; never inferred from the model name aloneS9 has a route-backed install rail (public network write + SD trial). Sibling host artifacts are hash-pinned, but media write and boot authority wait for a witnessed physical selector.Beta (S9) · Experimental (siblings)
am2-XIL — S17 / T17Board-specific foothold possible; the exact stock path still requires promotion evidenceS17 Pro has an Experimental external-media builder. Recovery capsules can be analysed, but no first-stage loader is held.No customer write route
am2-XIL — S19 Pro / S19j ProDepends on the source firmware; stock single-slot is never silently flashedGuarded self-update from an already-running DCENT_OS, plus target-bound external-media preparation, gated on signed package, restore-verified backup and recovery staging. Vendor-source first install remains a non-executable evidence gap.Experimental lab route · first-install evidence gap
Plain S19Not inferred from S19 Pro / S19j ProExact Xilinx vendor recovery media can be verified and materialised. That is recovery, not a DCENT_OS install path.Recovery-only
am3-BB — BeagleBone / AM335xSSH is often present as a non-root miner user; the 22322 escalation is fail-closedPhysical SD-first route. NAND install waits for SD recovery, a full NAND backup and restore-to-stock promotion.Hardware / manual route required
am3-AML — Amlogic A113DMar-2024..Aug-2025 stock has an assisted USB-OTG downgrade; Sept-2025+ stock requires a physical routeExact package, selector and backup-first planning for admitted identities; live rootfs-window execution stays proof-gated.Experimental lab · late-lock hardware-limited
cv1835 — CVitek CV1835No stock-signing bypass — RSA+AES eFuse-locked FIPRuntime candidate staging, rollback and one-shot external reinjection exist. There is no local boot hook, no DCENT start and no OS-install authority.Detected-but-unsupported · install denied

Identity granularity matters inside a single row: an S19k Pro on cv1835 is detected but unsupported as a customer install, and it is never merged with the Amlogic S19k row.

Bottom line: only the Antminer S9 (am1-XIL) has a public network-write / SD-trial route today. Every current-generation Antminer (S17 / S19 / S19j Pro / S19k Pro / S21) stock first-install is lab-gated, evidence-gap, or no-customer-write. BitAxe / ESP devices have real OTA/USB routes. It is not one-click and it is not available to end users yet on Antminer stock. Those rows describe route-backed readiness, not a blanket write promise: the live write step sits behind explicit operator confirmation and the proof-ladder, and unlock and flash features are for hardware you own or are explicitly authorised to administer.

Can it install DCENT_OS for ESP on Bitaxe-class miners?

Yes — the ESP tier is the one place a customer has genuine rails. Running AxeOS / DCENT_axe devices update over HTTP OTA; a first flash uses USB serial. Model-pinned routes require the companion DCENT_axe manifest, and the toolbox validates boardTarget, deviceModel, payload SHA-256, the factory flash map and ota.updateFitsSlot before any upload or image write.

MinerASICBoard targetInstall pathCurrent proof
Bitaxe MaxBM1397bitaxe-maxOTA update or USB factory flashHost-tested driver path
Bitaxe UltraBM1366bitaxe-ultraOTA update or USB factory flashHost-tested driver path
Bitaxe SupraBM1368bitaxe-supraOTA update or USB factory flashHost-tested driver path
Bitaxe GammaBM1370bitaxe-gammaOTA update or USB factory flashHost-tested driver path; Gamma live-verified
Bitaxe Hex Ultra6× BM1366bitaxe-hex-ultraOTA update or USB factory flashHex dispatcher path host-tested; live soak pending
Bitaxe Hex Supra6× BM1368bitaxe-hex-supraOTA update or USB factory flashHost-tested hex dispatcher path, including the BM1368 job-id fix

Upload and image-write acceptance is not boot, rollback, thermal, or mining proof. LoRa mesh remains planned and default-OFF in the firmware binary.

Which platforms are proven mining on DCENT_OS?

The companion firmware, DCENT_OS, has been proven mining on five distinct platforms, and dcent verify-mining encodes a cold-boot proof ladder for each:

  • am1 — Antminer S9 (BM1387)
  • am2 (Zynq) — Antminer S19 Pro (BM1398) and S19j Pro (BM1362)
  • am3 (BeagleBone) — Antminer S19j Pro (BM1362)
  • am3 (Amlogic) — Antminer S21 (BM1368)

Mining proof is a firmware achievement, not a first-install permission. Mining-proof admission cannot certify an ambiguous identity or a stock first-install evidence gap.

How do I check my own miner?

Start read-only. dcent doctor is the canonical first step for every persona: it triages vendor, firmware, board and next steps, never writes and never destroys anything. Feed a fingerprint into the control-board router to see the exact route kind, commands and proof ceiling before you go anywhere near a write path.

dcent doctor 192.168.1.50                        # read-only triage: vendor, firmware, board, next steps
dcent fingerprint 192.168.1.50 --json > fingerprint.json
dcent controlboard-route --fingerprint-json fingerprint.json --json
dcent controlboard-route --list-targets --json   # route kind, commands, and proof ceiling
dcent install --list-routes                      # the install routes the toolbox knows

List the routes and run a --dry-run before assuming a write path is proven for your unit. If the router leaves you ambiguous, that is the correct answer, not a failure.

How do I install DCENT_Toolbox?

DCENT_Toolbox runs locally on Windows, macOS and Linux, but launch requires Python 3.9+ and a source checkout. There is no PyPI package and no published binary installer — install from the public GPL-3.0 repository:

git clone https://github.com/DCentralTech/DCENT_Toolbox.git
cd DCENT_Toolbox
python -m pip install -e .

The keygen-style TUI (dcent tui, via the [tui] extra) is the flagship interactive surface. The Tauri desktop GUI in the tree is a scaffold that does not yet install, and there is no published Windows/macOS/Linux download URL — one trustworthy signed binary per OS is a target, not a shipped artifact. Drive the toolbox from the CLI or the TUI.

Where the toolbox is weakest

Publishing the limits is the point of a support matrix. As of 2.5.0:

  • Vendor first-install is not one-click. The S9 is the only public-beta network write path; the rest is evidence-gap or lab-gated.
  • Prepare/unlock is plan-only. The rail is ranked and the recommended archive is built in-process with a reported SHA-256, but nothing is uploaded and dcent unlock is not executed against a miner. Ambiguous boards never get a generic unlock.
  • Discovery is neighbour-first. Fresh ARP/UDP first, then a cheap presence probe, then identify only the responders. MAC and model hints are never identity. Mature single-vendor fleet tools still beat us on raw LAN presence speed and one-pass fleet rows — that is an honest gap we are closing, not a claim about anyone else’s product.
  • Launch requires Python and a source checkout. No installer, no PyPI package, no binary download.

How is this different from the rest of the category?

Positioning by honest capability, not by attacking anyone. DCENT_Toolbox is:

  • 0% dev fee, 0% pool-fee adder, 0% license-server gating. There is no fee lever to pull, because there is no fee mechanism in the code.
  • 100% local. No cloud tether, no remote account, no license activation, no telemetry. It runs entirely from your laptop or lab bench and never phones home.
  • Multi-vendor by construction. Four vendor backends and six firmwares behind one CLI and one TUI, with a read-only fallback for gear it does not recognise — instead of one vendor’s firmware installing itself.
  • GPL-3.0-only, source published. Every claim on this page is checkable against the repository, including the ones that say “no.”

DCENT_Toolbox is built by the Mining Hackers at D-Central Technologies in Québec — a Bitcoin mining technology company operating since 2016. We open-source the tools we use on our own bench because operators should be able to own, inspect and repair their own hardware.

Scale, for context: version 2.5.0 ships roughly 75 user-facing top-level commands with 4,500+ offline tests passing, across 491 Python modules and 87 CLI command modules.

Credits

This work stands on published open-source research. The hashboard EEPROM decryption algorithm and key tables are derived from — and kept byte-identical to — skot/amlogic-cb-tools (GPL-3.0). The ASIC drivers, APIs and protocols were informed by ESP-Miner (GPL-3.0), pyasic (Apache-2.0) and asic-rs (Apache-2.0).

Where next