DCENT_OS 0.9.0 — beta20261002 now has 17 exact-board artifact sets available on the beta channel, labeled Experimental: two sysupgrade archives and 15 native SD images. These are development-key downloads with physical qualification pending, not a production-stable firmware release.
Development signing key: select it explicitly
This Experimental distribution uses an explicitly approved development key. Its raw Ed25519 public key is 131d0f0830b9a4118fe2bfb0670babef628a9611aa186d05db081ce0d1599bec; the SHA-256 fingerprint of those raw key bytes is 372a5c3e8a85110ef322b1bccf79187bfe801cea890c89bdc35ad6b35abb2fbc. The July public beta key and default installer trust pins remain unchanged. Verify this release using the separately published development public key, not a key selected implicitly from the package.
The new release record provides the exact public-key file checksum, original artifact names, bytes, SHA-256 receipts, signatures, current source availability and coverage and read-only verification instructions. All 17 sets passed the supported full producer verifier under this explicitly selected development key before publication.
Clean matching DCENT_OS project source is staged with exact file receipts pending publication authorization. Dependency and third-party boot coverage is partial or unverified; this is not a complete firmware corresponding-source or GPL-compliance claim.
Choose the exact model and controller
The two archives target S9 Xilinx (am1-s9) and S19j Pro Xilinx (am2-s19j, build/package filename target am2-s19jpro). The S9 archive declares first-install-only package permission and advertises no self-update command; a runnable source-firmware route must be confirmed separately. The S19j Pro archive is limited to its guarded existing-DCENT_OS target-update route, including its inactive-slot and verified-restore prerequisites. The running firmware must already accept this development signing authority; selecting the key for host verification does not change miner trust. This publication does not authorize changing miner runtime trust settings. Neither archive is a raw SD image or an authorization for another controller.
The native SD sets target S9i, S9j, S9 SE, S9k, S15, T15, S17 (am2-s17p only; no S17 Pro inference), S17+, T17, T17+, S19 Pro, S19, T19, S19a and S19+. Preserve each supplied image’s original filename and all adjacent signed media/runtime sidecars. These sets authorize external-media boot preparation, not NAND installation.
Start with controller identification, then follow the exact board’s download and recovery card. Never rename an image to a sibling model or treat the standardized release label as the signed original filename.
Verification and hardware qualification are separate
Checksums verify file bytes; signatures authenticate those bytes under the explicitly selected development key. Host verification does not prove cold boot, accepted pool shares, endurance, safe power lifecycle or recovery on this exact artifact. Physical qualification remains pending. Keep full unit backups and controller-specific recovery preparation where a route requires persistent writes.
The October 3, 19:14 UTC build snapshot recorded 17 completed outputs and 12 pending targets. This publication covers the individually verified 17 sets; it does not claim that all 29 targets have finished. Pending targets in that snapshot were T17e, S17e, BeagleBone S19j Pro and nine Amlogic lanes: S19j Pro Classic, S19j Pro A126, S19j Pro+, S19j XP, S19k Pro, S19 XP, S21, S21 Pro and S21 XP. Their files are not added by this publication.
The immutable July release record retains its original dates, hashes, signature scope and route limitations. The new Experimental release is documented separately so development-key packages cannot inherit the July trust or installation contract. Release index · Documentation · Installation boundaries
Source withdrawal and redistribution limits
Two source archives were withdrawn: one contained a restricted compiler payload, and one contained unrelated raw vendor fixtures. Clean replacements are staged pending publication authorization. Three upstream/build-source archives remain public. Current public dependency evidence covers 98 of 259 records; 88 clean records are staged, 72 unmatched, and one restricted record withheld. Development signing-key approval does not establish redistribution permission or license clearance. The 17 finished images embed third-party kernel, boot and FPGA components whose redistribution permission and exact source correspondence remain unverified. No complete corresponding-source, GPL-compliance or reproducibility claim is made.
